Computerised facial recognition systems have developed to the extent that they can compete with and aid human experts with cases of disputed identity. With the advent of CCTV, facial recognition has now become a tool for crime prevention and detection. As the use of such systems becomes more widespread, the legal system is now having to deal with the contentious issues surrounding the implementation of new and developing technologies.
Introduction
This chapter aims to introduce the theme of surveillance, relate public and private interests to CCTV and outline some of the legal history surrounding facial identification.
A History of Surveillance
The etymology of the word 'surveillance' arises from the French language, meaning 'to watch over'. There are many techniques that may fall into the broad category of surveillance, some of which will be discussed in this chapter. The aspect of facial recognition will be the main theme of this paper, concentrating on legal problems associated with computerised recognition in both public and private spheres. For computer systems to be able to identify and subsequently recognise subjects, suitable surveillance capabilities must also be p resent; the immediate issues surrounding such invasive techniques will not be dealt with here as they must be in situ in order that the facial biometric systems may function.
Surveillance is not a modern concept: records have been kept containing details of people's whereabouts, possessions and wealth over centuries. The ancient Egyptians maintained population records for improving control over tax, military operations and immigration; the Book of Numbers describes the great census of the Israelites; and t he Doomsday Book of 1086 can be seen as the precursor to today's Census prepared every decade by the governmental records office.
These ancient records were prepared laboriously, taking many years to assemble, from which only a limited number of simple facts could be deduced such as population size, density, birth rate etc. These statistics were often out of date by the time all the data was collated. With the advent of printing, the so-called Gutenberg Chapter revolution 2 , administrative power could be increased and beaurocracy was firmly established. Extensive records could not only be maintained, but also distributed efficiently in vast numbers to various individuals, institutions or amongst nations.
With modern computerised technology and digital storage even greater possibilities arise: storage capacity is almost unlimited, file copying and transfer occurs instantaneously, trends may be observed and hypotheses calculated to provide immediate predictions and results.
Surveillance, therefore, exists in modern society. The way it is used and the ways in which it is, or should be controlled may differ according to the goals of the user. The following sections briefly examine public and private sector interests in surveillance.
Private Sector Interests
Businesses, enterprises and companies regard personal details as valuable commodities. They can be used to increase their market and target individual sales; such details may be bought and sold to other parties, also for a price. Surveillance of customer consumer habits demonstrates the Marxist theory of information capitalism 3 which customers endure for their loyalty card rewards and special offers tailored to their individual tastes.
Foulcault's theory of power 4 is exemplified when surveillance occurs in the workplace. Although there may be a capitalist drive to improve the efficiency of the staff by observing them, it is the knowledge that the staff are being observed that drives them to meet targets or observe certain work-place rules. A certain level of observation may be reached before the act of surveillance encroaches on the employees' privacy and becomes a threatening or critical eye undermining their ability to work productively and harmoniously.
Public Sector Interests
As servants of the State, democratic governments assume the right to monitor their citizens to ensure that fairness and equality prevails. Access to services, the law and justice are seen as justifiable reasons to implement suitable levels of surveillance in a rational approach to providing a solution to specific problems. The Weberian approach 5 argues that new technology is not the cause of new surveillance practices, but that such techniques can aid the functioning of the state institutions, which in this case is the prevention of crime and disorder.
Foulcault's theory of power again extends to the public sector with the benevolent desire to protect society and to punish deviant behaviour. As seen by the Bentham's 
Computerised Recognition
The many forms of computerised human recognition have traditionally been positive acts of recognition, with the individual actually wanting to be identified by the machine. It has often been performed by one of two measures: what you know (such as a password), or what you have (such as an i dentity card) to allow entry into the computers records and databanks. These two forms of security are often compromised if someone comes into possession of a stolen or fake ID card, or learns the current password, making the system vulnerable to unauthorised access. To make the system more secure, the 'protectors' must be aware of the technologies and capabilities of the criminals or hackers who wish to break into their system; with 5 Lyon & Zureik, 1996 . Pg. 7 6 Lyon, 1991 . 7 Orwell, 1954 . 8 Huxley, 1955 many security systems being broken soon after their implementation, organisations are constantly looking for ways to further improve their security.
A third category of secure identification has evolved that may be labelled as who you are, which is less easy to mimic. Biometric identifiers such as your fingerprint and other u nique personal features are being exploited by commercially available technologies currently being used in many environments to determine a person's identity. Such methods of identification may not necessarily involve positive participation by the individual the computer seeks to recognise, thus allowing the system to detect intruders or those who may wish to conceal their identity.
The patterns of the iris, like the contours of our fingerprints, are unique among individuals and can be used as a basis for biometric recognition. Two new commercial developments involving iris recognition are of particular interest. Firstly the UK Building Society, Nationwide, is pioneering an iris recognition scheme in place of the traditional Personal Identification Number (PIN).
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The camera can locate the iris and measure some 266 characteristics, which is then translated into a unique code for that individual. The code is carried within the magnetic strip of the bank cash-card, and can be compared to the user of the automatic cash dispenser to verify customer identity. Unlike the PIN, this code cannot be discovered by anyone else, or forgotten by the true user.
The second use of iris recognition was reported in the US Government Computer News in September 1999. 10 The US armed forces have taken an interest in biometric recognition as a replacement to passwords for access to computers and biological weapon controls. Traditional passwords were becoming increasingly difficult to remember, as multiple eight digit codes were required for various systems. This security system had advantages over alternative methods: as voice recognition fails through protective headgear, and finger/hand prints cannot feasibly be performed with rubber gloves. Iris recognition was favoured as a facial biometric analysis, even functioning correctly through plastic shields and protective glasses. 9 As Reported in The Guardian , Tuesday 14 March 2000  10 Daukantas, 1999 Iris recognition, however, appears to be useful only when the subject is close to the scanning device and allows a scan to be performed voluntarily. Alternatively, it may be used when a suspect is apprehended and forced into an iris scan in a similar manner to the recording of fingerprints in police custody. The fingerprint method, however, has a distinct advantage over iris recognition. 'Trails' are l eft by the individual that can prove where the individual has been and what they have touched.
The prints may be lifted after the suspect has left the scene, whereas with iris recognition the only available trails are from CCTV cameras that would not provide the desired resolution to scan the inner part of the eye. Human identification and recognition from a distance must employ a more general form of recognition to allow law enforcement agencies to exploit the use of computer technology.
Taking advantage of the CCTV cameras, the use of crime scene pictures to identify criminals was becoming commonplace. Previously only the eyewitness could provide evidence to link a suspect to a crime scene, with the advent of CCTV, the judge and jury could see for themselves how similar the accused and the assailant's images were. However, the clarity or CCTV images and the tendency for security videos to photograph images one or two seconds apart gave poor grounds for accurate recognition. The lighting levels and face angles could also hinder human recognition pathways. 11 By taking measurements of the face and analysing the face as a whole, a further biometric identification process was established, allowing computer systems to make their own assessment of similarity b etween the accused and the assailant. These systems became important when CCTV footage was too poor for human recognition and where no reliable eyewitnesses were present.
As with any new technology, the use and reliability of these methods, particularly when they form the sole piece of evidence for a prosecution case, are of interest to the legislature, judiciary and citizens alike.
Landmarks in the Juridical System of Facial Identification
The first instance of a photograph being admitted as evidence in a court of law was in 1864. Bruce & Young, 1986. 18 Studies by Ellis et al., 1979; Klatzky & Forrest, 1984; Faw, 1992; Valentine & Bruce, 1986 Chapter 2 -An unfamiliar person was mistakenly or incorrectly identified 3 -A seemingly familiar person was recognised, but could not be identified 4 -Only partial details of a familiar person could be retrieved from memory This is of particular concern when CCTV footage is of poor quality and the chance of mis-identification is increased, as most CCTV targets are unfamiliar to police officers and the subjects of attacks. Identification parades have been criticised as to their reliability as evidence, however the jury continually regard such identification quite highly, obviously estimating human recognition to be considerably accurate. A comparison of two computer-based recognition systems with human recognition was carried out 21 in a study involving a graph matching system and a principal component analysis system. The two systems had a remarkable similarity to the human recognition pathways suggested for familiar and previously unfamiliar faces.
Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
This facial At first glance, the two images appear to be a different person. Closer examination by looking at the inner facial features reveals that the images are of the same person.
As these faces are previously unknown, the brain recognises the features associated with the face such as short dark hair, rather than the actual face details such as eye 24 Both figures are composite faces composed using the identikit software PROfit as downloaded from www.zeda-abm.com shape and the positioning of the nose and mouth. The computer, likewise, recognises the shading and area coverage of the hair and other features, although it may make calculations that are more accurate than human recognition.
The faults with such a system occur when changes in luminosity affect the shading of the face; the angle of the head reveals different areas of the face; expression changes the position of the eyebrows and the mouth. Human identification and recognition pathways may be able to take these factors into account through interpolation. Quite often the human mind can imagine how a previously unfamiliar face may look when a surprised expression is maintained or vice versa. However, differences in the hair length and facial features o ccur on a daily basis resulting in drastic differences over weeks, months and years that can cause failures in the recognition systems of both humans and computers.
PCA can be a useful tool for detecting the gender, race 25 and age of a target using the location and size of the facial features as a general guide for categorisation.
However, a standardised picture is still required unless some other system could interpret the head rotation and take into account the lighting levels and the distance between the subject and the camera. Although this would not lead to identification, some form or recognition is still being performed by the Principal Component Analysis.
It is suggested that first-glance identification and recognition of previously unknown faces in human recognition follow a similar pathway to the PCA methodology. As the counterpart human recognition pathway is considered to be significantly poorer than familiar recognition, it may seem logical to suppose that PCA recognition will perform poorer than the following graph matching system. comparisons. This analysis of biometric target points located around the eyes, nose, mouth etc. is the suggested model for human recognition of familiar faces as changes in the hairstyles and clothing of the people who we are familiar with do not prevent us from recognising them. However, a computer system can be directed to analyse only the area around the eyes and the nose, whereas human vision cannot be so selective for unfamiliar recognition. The surrounding facial shape and attributes will always be recognised by humans and will become involved in the decision process as to whether the subject is familiar, leading to the subsequent retrieval of semantic information such as their name and profession etc.
Graph Matching
Graph matching succeeds on many of the failure points identified by the PCA method. The angle of the head can be taken into account using algorithms; hairstyle and daily changes in luminosity do not affect the positioning of the facial features;
and expression has a less profound effect on the algorithm than observed with PCA.
With graph matching, the genotypic features are being used for biometric comparison. These qualities change only slightly over the subjects' lifespan compared to the daily changes observed in the analysis of phenotypic features used in PCA. The performance limitation of genotypic analysis is the false identification rate, for which Daugman 27 uses the birth rate of monozygotic twins. This leads to a minimum false acceptance rate of approx. 0.82% due to birth rate alone.
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Phenotypic analysis is limited by the false reject rate and is a reflection of environmental contributions to a person's appearance that is less easy to quantify.
The similarities between the computerised recognition systems and the proposed models for human recognition are encouraging for the development and success of further advanced recognition programs. It is not entirely proven how familiar recognition is performed in humans, however, graph matching reveals a similar 27 
Facial Recognition Systems
Recently, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has canvassed for potential computerised recognition systems capable of accurately and reliably identifying both known and unknown subjects from a distance.
30
The aim of the project is to promote the development of facial recognition systems, providing a forum for academic, public and private research with the aim of increasing the use and improving the reliability of such systems. The following sections will look at some computerised facial recognition systems that concentrate on the facial features and calculate their relative positions on the face from a CCTV or similar camera placed at a limited distance from the subject.
Current Applications
As discussed in the previous chapter, the biometrics of the entire face have established themselves as a capable means of identification. Chapter determine the precise location of pre-defined features within the face. Image capture can occur from static frames, such as photographs taken of an incident, or from realtime moving faces on a CCTV video camera, allowing recognition to take place from a number of available resources. Many of these software applications are available to both public and private enterprises, which raises questions over who is able to operate surveillance systems and whether they are registered or monitored in relation to human rights issues.
The algorithm used is based upon the inner regions of the face, therefore, changes in hairstyle, colour or facial expression do not affect identification, thus avoiding some of the faults associated with Principal Component Analysis as discussed in the previous chapter. In addition, background lighting does not pose a threat to the recognition system, so long as some ambient lighting is present, allowing the camera to focus on the subject. Facial hair and accessories such as hats and spectacles are not part of the overall recognition analysis, which, along with hairstyle, are major distractors with human recognition, 32 thus having the potential to demonstrate a higher success rate than human recognition.
DMV Case Study
In the US, State Departments of Motor Vehicles ( DMVs) are using software developed by Visionics and Polaroid, to prevent criminals from obtaining multiple licences under different names. 33 Not only are the false licences fraudulently used by criminals convicted of motoring offences, but illegal copies a re also used as age verification by younger individuals who are under the minimum legal drinking age.
By preventing anyone but the original licensee from being issued a duplicate licence, both aspects of fraud can be targeted using such a system.
Both graph matching and PCA may be employed to some extent with this type of verification procedure. As the images are standard sizes and contain full frontal views with similar lighting levels, principal component analysis can be used, although only at a basic l evel to prevent daily ageing and changes in hairstyle from becoming a distractor. To improve the use of the program, an algorithm is able to convert near-front face geometry into full frontal facial equivalents, allowing a wider range of CCTV pictures to b e used, as the criminal is not always looking directly at the camera.
Searches can be performed against the custody records to find the nearest matching 
37
The 12 horizontal and 6 vertical landmarks around the eyes, nose, ears and mouth are manually positioned, although the centre of each eye can be identified semi-automatically using Visionics Software.
Further searches can be performed using a simple search engine, finding similar persons matching witness descriptions, or by looking for similar events such as bank robberies, or incidents that took place in the same area involving three persons.
Crime pattern analysis can be performed to check for crime hot-spots or frequent times so that the police can allocate their resources accordingly. Such a search engine replaces the ideology of principal component analysis, as manually entered data such as 'dark collar-length hair' is a substitute for the pixel colour and distribution data.
PROfile acts as a form of crime detection tool by identifying individuals caught on CCTV and is able to search for related crimes. However, unlike the DMV case study, searching and recognition is not completely automatic, as a crime intelligence officer must enter the data into the system manually, adding the facial landmarks to each photograph to generate the algorithm to be used to compare the face against the other records. Future research into facial recognition may provide the ability for computers to recognise not only the face, but to be able to determine the location and relative size of the eyes, nose, mouth and other facial landmarks.
Mandrake Case Study
As crime prevention has been shown to be more significant in security issues, and that crime detection is of more significance to the police and other law enforcement agencies, amalgamating the two approaches to computerised recognition may provide a powerful solution to combat crime.
By combining both the automatic recognition technology of the DMV case study and the criminal databases of known criminals exploited by the PROfile system, much research has been undertaken to formulate a recognition system which can alarm the law enforcing agencies as to the presence of a known criminal. Many commercially and publicly funded ventures have involved such technology, the first CCTV and facial recognition system in the UK was instigated by the Metropolitan Police in Newham, East London.
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Despite pressure from many civil liberties groups, the system named Mandrake is able to examine every passing face and alert the police 38 As reported in the Observer, 11 October 1998 when a given individual is recognised from the police database. The system relies wholly on a graph matching system, analysing the area around the eyes and the nose which can be converted into an algorithm without any manual intervention that was necessary for the PROfile system.
However, placing high-quality security systems on the corner of every street would not be economically possible, although many councils have established CCTV networks covering most of the town centre and cover many areas susceptible to crime. Stockton-on-Tees, one of many UK cities to employ CCTV networks, has over 47 cameras in the centre alone and more cameras located in the residential areas of a town with less than 200,000 inhabitants.
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One of the many potential problems of an instant-alert system is that previously convicted petty criminals going about their daily business would be constantly 'recognised' and their presence would be relayed to the police. Society would feel that a major invasion of privacy had occurred, with their identity and exact location being too easily available to the police. To combat anxieties such as these, Newham
Council gave as an example the way in which twelve known paedophiles in the area who would only be positively identified by cameras adjacent to the local schools.
Thus, the daily movements of the known o ffenders were not continually monitored and their general privacy was not impinged upon. Internal checks administered by the law enforcement agency would cause records to be kept of who was to be targeted, who authorised the surveillance and what areas were to be covered.
By placing a surveillance system in a unique area and attaching a database specific to known criminals who would operate in that area, a reasonable successful hit rate can be achieved without infringing the general privacy of the public. 
Reliability of Automatic Facial Recognition
In 1998, the House of Lords Select Committee on the Submission of Digital Images as Evidence reported on the potential to change or manipulate digital images and records leaving little or no obvious sign of tampering.
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Whilst the report was concerned with the validity of the images as a whole and of the quality of the picture, further problems arise concerning the reliability of identification from traditional and digital images. With both technological analysis and human judgement being involved in the process, the reliability of both human and automatic analysis of CCTV footage may be questioned.
By comparing computerised facial recognition with the counterpart models of human recognition, an assessment of the possibility to employ biometric identifiers has already been made. Whilst the previous chapter demonstrated that computers were indeed capable of automatically identifying and subsequently recognising human faces, the accuracy and reliability of facial recognition software has become increasingly important as computer technology plays an ever-increasing role in the modern courtroom. 42 .
The software companies producing identification and recognition systems such as those highlighted in chapter two produce brochures and manuals effectively selling the product to interested parties. In-house testing can be extremely subjective, with 41 Select Committee on Science and Technology, 5 th Report 42 Widdison, 1997 Chapter varying aims, goals and test data depending on the actual use and requirements of the tasks the algorithms were developed to perform. The accuracy and reliability of their products, however, can only be assessed by comparing the product with standardised references or samples and subjecting them to further analysis by independent bodies.
In 1996, the Californian Welfare Fraud Prevention Squad commissioned a report to examine the current techniques for biometric identification, with particular attention given to accuracy, closed and open search requirements and data collection error rates. 43 The report rejected facial recognition along with iris scan biometrics due to the lack of research and development at that time. F ingerprint analysis was recommended to the Californian authority, having open and closed search abilities, low data collection errors and a high user acceptance rate. The measurement of accuracy, however, was conducted in such a way that not only could two facial biometric applications be compared, but they could also be assessed against other systems employing hand geometry, retinal and iris scans, fingerprint and other biometric algorithms.
Firstly, the rate of false acceptance was calculated from the number of occurrences where an individual is wrongly accepted as a match, and secondly, the rate of false rejects was recorded when the system failed to recognise a legitimate match.
Creating a graph of both values as a function of the threshold for recognition, the point where the two error rates intersect was taken as the accuracy of the system: the greater the cross-over value, the greater the inherent accuracy of the system. This type of assessment could then compare different techniques to select the m ost appropriate approach to combat a given problem. This independent analysis was also free from the bias and propensity of company sales literature.
The FERET Programme
In 1996 the FERET Verification Testing Protocol for Face Recognition Algorithms was devised to provide an accurate and independent assessment of the reliability and accuracy of existing facial recognition systems. It also served to promote research in Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves employ similar 'failure to enroll' and 'failure to acquire' rates to the Californian report. False match rate and false nonmatch rate were plotted on log-log scales as shown in figures 1 and 2. 
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Note that to achieve a recognition probability of >90%, the system will exhibit a higher false alarm rate: the best system having a 10% false alarm rate, with others varying from 30 to 60%. By reducing the false alarm rate, the general trend was a reduction in verification probability. 44 Phillips et al., 1997 Over six months, the >90% recognition rate using the same FERET protocol exhibited a general reduction in false alarm rates. The best system exhibited < 2% false alarm rates, with others varying from 20 -30%. This gave the system an increased recognition probability with no significant increase in false alarm rates. In addition, the position of the target face may also affect performance. A 15-degree difference in position between the query image and the database image creates a significant difference in the recognition threshold, and a difference of 45 degrees renders the system ineffective for recognition.
These results give facial biometrics a disadvantage over other identifiers; however, by identifying the weaknesses further improvements may be seen in the future.
Despite the limitations from luminosity and face position, the process of identification was proven as successful and provides some useful resources to the field of law enforcement.
FRVT 2000
With significant improvement in the development of facial algorithms for 
Potential for Miscarriages of Justice
The previous chapter analysed the reliability of computer-mediated recognition and assessed the apparent success rate of automatic facial recognition. The potential for errors within computerised systems in a legal environment raises concern for judicial mistakes, whether the systems in question are fully automated or directed by human supervision.
The Use of Statistics in Evidence
The analysis of the reliability of facial biometric systems provides an assessment based on percentages, probability and other statistical measurements. Redmayne 47 highlighted the key question of 'Can liability be based on naked statistical evidence?'
Whilst evidence from an expert witness, based around scientific analysis, opinion and statistics, is admissible in the UK, the Supreme Court in Minnesota held that scientific evidence should not be presented in probabilistic terms.
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The decision from the more recent case of State v. Bloom 49 held an exemption to the no probability rule. DNA test results expressed in probabilistic terms were permitted as evidence, principally due to the reliability of testing and the unique composition of DNA amongst individuals. However, the principal problems with presenting evidence in terms of probability is universal and relies more on the interpretation of statistics rather than the techniques used to obtain them.
47 Redmayne, 2000 Chapter As facial biometric analysis relies on algorithmic searching of unique identifiers, the matching of an individual's mugshot with a crime scene photograph can be expressed in terms of probability. This occurs not only with facial biometrics, but with fingerprint matching, blood and semen analysis and most other types of forensic evidence. Explaining probability to the jury has been questioned at the Court of Appeal with no unproblematic solutions emerging. In the UK, R v. Deen 50 highlighted the difference between two confusing questions posed by the prosecution and the defence:
1. What is the probability of finding the evidence, given that the defendant is innocent?
2. What is the probability that the defendant is innocent, given the evidence?
In other terms, if there is a 1:3 million probability that suspect A is the face on the CCTV footage of an assault, it does not mean that there is a 1:3 million probability that A committed the crime. Explaining the implications of probability to the jury is not an easy task, particularly when both the prosecution and the defence will present the evidence to favour their case.
The first question only proves that there is a high degree of similarity between the suspect and the assailant. This question should be answered by the expert witness based on statistical evidence and is analogous to an identity parade with an eye witness.
The second question should be put to the jury with appropriate direction by the judge presiding over the case. The probability of innocence must take any other pieces of evidence into account and also examine the likelihood of other individuals matching the assailant's biometrics. In R v. Deen, the Lord Chief girlfriend. Adams was convicted at the court of first instance, however, an expert witness from the defence explained how to apply Bayes' Theorem to the jury. An appeal was granted as the judge failed to explain the Bayesian method clearly in the summing up, however, the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction but criticised Bayes' Theorem. A re-trial was ordered, and the conviction was held.
Several attempts to convert statistics into more manageable or significant terms for the jury have been made, including translating numbers into a verbal scale of probability.
Although this allows a better comparison of cases and makes presentation easier, the scheme lacks precision and may be interpreted differently as words can have different meaning for each individual.
The Technological Revolution
The primary cause for concern with technology per se arises from the interconnectivity of cameras, computers and databases between private companies, national police agencies, and international law enforcers. Whilst this allows for swift and effective exchange of data to improve and update resources, it also amplifies and distributes the data that has been gathered:
"Now through the database alone, the subject has been multiplied and decentred, capable of being acted upon by computers at many social locations without the least awareness by the individual concerned"
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Serious problems arises when erroneous or false entries are made on one database, which are then carried around the network of computers and databases, replicated many times over. These mistakes, even when they are identified may be difficult to 51 As described in Redmayne, 2000 52 R v. Adams [1996 The Times, August 14 1996 completely eradicate from the entire network due to the back-up and assimilation capabilities of modern technology. One such example occurred when two British football fans were wrongly deported from Belgium due to a database error -a sixyear campaign revealed that their names were still entered on some national databases describing the individuals as football hooligans despite having been removed completely from the Belgian database.
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Networking databases raises problems of rights to access information concerning the individual, which are often brushed away by State Security Services under the guise of 'National Interests' to remain immune from data protection laws, judicial scrutiny, legal or political accountability. There is an obvious danger that police records could move towards this type of immunity, however, the laws on court procedure, evidence-handling, etc. will maintain the necessary checks on the validity of data.
Restricting database access can prevent mis-use by implementing a user request service with authorisation coming from a higher ranking officer, however, increased beaurocracy will ultimately cause delays in finding relevant information. The EU have proposed model for investigation management that will electronically log who accessed the database, for what purpose, who gave authorisation and what data was viewed added or removed.
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Although the human rights of the innocent must be upheld, there will be an increasing danger of criminals escaping conviction on technicalities designed to prevent police and judicial investigations from abusing both public and private databases. The right to privacy must occasionally be stretched to allow investigating authorities to invade that privacy on a minor level to prevent a more serious crime of rape or assault from occurring in the future.
Entering facial biometric data into networked databases can ultimately permit a user to locate a known individual through CCTV cameras as discussed in relation to the a suspect can be located before any further crimes are committed provided the suspect enters territory covered by a camera. Whilst this may be useful for the arrest of a wanted suspect and prevent further crimes occurring, using such a system to locate an individual on the basis of suspicion or without any warrant to do so would be severely abusing the position of power the official has through access to the database.
The principle of presumed innocence would be breached by such fishing expeditions;
by implementing database access controls, restrictions, user management log checks and other regulatory practices, such unlawful use can be restricted but never fully eradicated.
Discrimination
Further potential for the miscarriage of justice lies in the domain of discrimination:
not only racially, but also socially and financially. CCTV surveillance is generally ?? 40% of people were targeted for "no obvious reason", mainly "on the basis of belonging to a particular or subcultural group". "Black people were between one-and-a-half and two-and-a-half times more likely to be surveilled than one would expect from their presence in the population".
?? 30% of targeted surveillances on black people were protracted, lasting 9 minutes or more, compared with just 10% on white people.
55 Tupman, 1998 56 Norris & Armstrong, 1997 ?? People were selected primarily on the basis of "the operators negative attitudes towards male youth in general and black male youth in particular. …[I]f a youth was categorised as a 'scrote' they were subject to prolonged and intensive surveillance."
?? Those deemed to be "out of time and out of place" with the commercial image of the city centre streets were subjected to prolonged surveillance. "Thus drunks, beggars, the homeless, street traders were all subject to intense surveillance".
?? Finally, "anyone who directly challenged, by gesture or d eed, the right of the cameras to monitor them was especially subject to targeting".
However, the general prejudices and discriminatory trends of the CCTV operators may be simplified into rules that can be followed by the most simple automated decision making system. Whilst motion and heat detectors may be 'blind' to race and gender, the processing of digital images can distinguish between black and white, and through algorithmic processing, future developments may be able to differential between male and f emale, young and old. No laws exist to restrict the use of discriminatory algorithms, as many banks and credit companies utilise such automated processes for credit applications.
The Church Case
The appeal cases of R v. Following a further trial the accused was again found guilty.
This case saw conflicting opinions from several experts in the field of facial identification, biometric analysis and facial mapping, some of whom had developed expertise through experience rather than scientific training. With ongoing appeal at the Review Commission, this case will no doubt be used as an example for future cases, causing expert evidence in the field of facial identification to be called into question. The opinion of the Review Commission will no doubt set a precedent in this field, however, they must be careful not to damage the progress made by technology in the legal environment without serious thought as to the future of facial recognition.
Profiling
Although not a direct concern to facial recognition technology, Effross 64 raises concern over the profiling of normal everyday persons, who, perhaps, frequent certain locations more often then others. The profiling of known criminals is considered acceptable, as its primary aim is to provide evidence that will lead to the arrest of a criminal. Since the process of data collection and the building of profiles can be done automatically, there is the potential to allow profiles of most individuals Effross, 1999 to be constructed: the only limiting factor being the time taken to download and store the data that the computer has created.
Traditionally, police officer-based surveillance is only carried out when the detective team have sufficient evidence or 'instinct' to warrant the time and expense taken to set up such an undercover operation. With automatic profiling, there is no need for any number of persons to be present, and previous movements of the suspect may be drawn from archived data from the previous week, month, or even year.
Not only are the police able to construct and use personal profiles, but the abilities of the private sector are also increasing to allow profiles of customers and visitors to their premises both in the real world and in virtual reality through 'Trojan Horses' and 'Cookie' technology.
The records of what we buy and what sites we visit may be argued as private and personal information which should not be disclosed or as useful information to the vendor provided that they do not abuse the data that they have collected. Commerce has the technology to record the transactions we make through electronic points of sale (EPOS), credit and debit cards, supermarket loyalty cards etc. for a number of years, with presumed consent to pass on your details to third parties unless you tick the small box at the bottom of the page.
It is doubtful as to whether pictoral profiling of people during everyday events by private enterprises will ever be accepted as ethical practice for commercial purposes or even for police access either as a resource or connected via a computer database linkage. Police access to health records has been a controversial area, primarily due to the health care professionals' guarantee of privacy to their patients; police access has so far been on an ad hoc basis with the health authorities requiring convincing reasons for their disclosure.
Banks, also, will act in the interests of their customer to protect their privacy without substantial justification for police investigations, however, the owners of CCTV archives will generally be supermarkets, local councils, retailers and other private enterprises with less regard for the rights of privacy of the individuals who frequent their premises. Quite often, a retailer would gladly o ffer CCTV footage to police enquiries as the apprehension of criminals or even potential offenders would be to their advantage. The sole reason for the existence of CCTV in their premised is to detect and discourage theft or damage to their property or merchandise.
The Future
Future developments and the legal decisions surrounding facial biometric analysis cannot be easily anticipated. This chapter will examine some future uses for recognition systems and provide some conclusions from the previous chapters.
A Legal Tool
From the number of criminal cases involving facial identification experts, it is almost certain that any developments in the field of computerised facial recognition will be explored and utilised by the legal profession. Their exact use and reliability will vary from system to system, however, police forces have already established Information Technology divisions and have drawn their resources together to provide an easier and more accessible flow of information. The value attached to the output of computerised identification systems will need to be decided by the operators and the legal weighting as evidence will continue to be decided by the judge and jury.
DARPA Project
The 
Chapter
Compared to the FERET and FRVT 2000 tests, this project aims to promote the development of facial recognition technology as well as providing more accurate and reliable biometric systems, extending surveillance capabilities and overcoming the current problems associated with facial recognition, as outlined in previous chapters.
Such developments are promising for all of the academic and public / private interests in computerised facial recognition. The enhancement of reliability and user acceptance will augment and consolidate the legal acceptance of such technology whilst current criminal cases provide the juridical precedents for future litigation.
